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Sander Greenland's elegant paper [6] raises deep ques-
tions about the way in which we choose and evaluate pub-
lic health actions. We agree with the main thrust of his
argument with respect to public health policy. We have
some concerns, however, about his treatment of social
causes, and on this point we focus our critique.
Greenland proposes a counterfactual definition of a cause
which is framed in terms of alternative actions with differ-
ent potential outcomes. He suggests that, under this
framework, social conditions – such as socioeconomic
status, sex, or race – present a quandary for causal infer-
ence. They cannot be considered as causes unless they can
be reframed in terms of alternative actions. Greenland's
approach to this problem is, thankfully, not to dismiss
social causes, but rather to "identify potential causes
within ordinary events". He suggests that we consider
alternative actions to change social conditions, and their
different potential outcomes.
We do not believe it is warranted to single out the identi-
fication of social causes or characteristics as posing an
especially severe problem for causal inference. Even under
this framework of alternative actions, similar problems
pertain to all kinds of exposures in observational studies.
It is important to acknowledge this similarity, because if
social exposures are perceived as being the most problem-
atic for studies of causation, investigations of these causes
and their remediation may be put at a disadvantage.
First, in our identification of their causal effects, most of
the exposures we study are more akin to conditions than
actions. To infer a causal relationship for an exposure, we
imagine that we could remove that exposure while "all
other things remained equal", and compare the outcomes
under the exposed and unexposed conditions. In other
words, we compare what happened under the condition
of exposure with what would have happened under the
condition of no exposure with "all else held constant".1
This is not truly equivalent to a comparison of the out-
comes of alternative actions, such as removing or not
removing the exposure. If we had actually removed the
exposure, all other things would not have remained equal.
Most of the causes we study are similar to social causes in
this respect. Consider the classic example of smoking cig-
arettes. If people were unable to smoke cigarettes, they
might as a result drink more alcohol, have more episodes
of depression, or gain more weight. All other things would
not remain equal. Thus, when we construct a counterfac-
tual that compares smoking with no smoking, we are not
truly comparing the potential outcomes of alternative
actions. We are constrained to comparing the outcomes
under two alternative conditions, one of which is neces-
sarily counterfactual.
Second, most of the exposures we examine can be seen as
the consequence of a previous action, and as a possible
mediator of its effect on health. As noted earlier, Green-
land suggests that we could reframe social causes (e.g.
years of education) as potential outcomes of previous
Published: 24 May 2005
Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:4 doi:10.1186/1742-7622-2-4
Received: 11 April 2005
Accepted: 24 May 2005
This article is available from: http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/4
© 2005 Susser and Schwartz; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Page 1 of 2
(page number not for citation purposes)
Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2005, 2:4 http://www.ete-online.com/content/2/1/4alternative actions (e.g. better schools to improve educa-
tional outcomes), which may in turn improve health. But
with equal legitimacy, most other exposures could be
reframed in the same way. We could reframe physical
activity as a potential outcome of previous alternative
actions to increase physical activity, which may in turn
improve health. For all these exposures, we continually
strive to better understand both the antecedents which
lead to the exposures, and the biological mechanisms
which connect them to disease outcomes.
Third, although some conditions turn out to be more
manipulable than others, we do not often know before-
hand which ones they will be. A researcher's judgment
about what conditions are and are not manipulable tends
to be influenced more by values than by scientific empir-
ical data. We certainly have no empirical data to support
the view that social causes are generally less manipulable
than others. On first impression, cigarette smoking may
appear to be a readily manipulable action. But it has
turned out to be extremely difficult to reduce the smoking
epidemic worldwide over the past half century. While cig-
arette consumption per person has declined in some high
income countries over the past few decades, the global
impact on health continues to accumulate, with a pre-
dicted rise in smoking-related illness and death in low and
middle income countries, where the vast majority of the
world's more than one billion smokers now live [1,2]. On
the other hand, raising levels of education, which may at
first seem a more difficult task, has actually been achieved
throughout much of the globe over the same period. With
regard to "fixed" characteristics such as sex, we seek to
modify their relationship to health and disease, by manip-
ulating biological and social experiences alike.
Notwithstanding these differences, we concur with Green-
land on his central point about the formulation of public
health policy. The effects of public health actions and pol-
icies "do not correspond to simple cause removal" {edi-
tor, citation to Greenland}. Therefore, we should clearly
differentiate two endeavors: the identification of causes
and the evaluation of interventions to remove these
causes.
Suppose we initiate a public health action to reduce smok-
ing in a population. Whatever action that may be (e.g.
banning the production and sale of cigarettes), it is not
plausible to think that it could result in a population in
which smoking cigarettes had been reduced while all
other things remained equal. The population will change
in its composition and historical time; the decline of the
cigarette industry may lead to unemployment and conse-
quent ill health in some regions, the opening of new mar-
kets for cigarettes in other areas, and so on.
Epidemiologic studies of causes provide crucial clues to
the design of preventive interventions, but they do not
provide good estimates of the impact of these interven-
tions. Like Greenland, we advocate studies that directly
compare the effects of alternative public health actions
(one of which may be inaction). We also believe that,
insofar as possible, these studies should compare the
effects of alternative actions across multiple health
domains rather than only a single domain.
Finally, we suggest that although epidemiologists most
often study conditions rather than actions, counterfactual
reasoning is applicable to our discipline. The inclusion of
conditions as causes has a long tradition under counter-
factual reasoning. In an early contribution to counterfac-
tual reasoning about causation, the philosopher Mackie
[3] argued that we must consider conditions as well as
actions to be potential causes (chapter 2). In the field of
psychology, Shadish et al. [4] adopt the counterfactual
approach to defining causes, and explicitly state that the
causes so defined include nonmanipulable as well as
manipulable events. From epidemiology, we quote Roth-
man and Greenland: "We can define a cause of a specific
disease as an antecedent event, condition, or characteristic
that was necessary for the occurrence of the disease at the
moment it occurred, given that other conditions are
fixed." [5] (p. 8, our italics).
Note
As Greenland describes, when we study an exposure as a
cause, our goal is to compare the outcomes of the same
people in the exposed and the unexposed state. We cannot
achieve this goal, but only approximate it. Thus we
directly measure the outcomes under the exposed state,
which did occur, but not under the unexposed state,
which did not occur and is therefore counterfactual. We
use the outcomes in another, unexposed group as a proxy
for what would have happened to the exposed group had
they not been exposed.
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